The UK Nuclear Industry has been at the forefront of the development and use of claims, arguments and evidence. The Chief nuclear inspector before the Parliamentary Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change, 22 July 2014 [10:31:30] stated:
– “examine the claims, examine the arguments… and seek evidence that backed up those claims”
The concepts are embedded in regulatory and industry practice and CAE is now explicitly used in the generic design assessment for the new reactor build programme in the United Kingdom (UK), and it is also recommended, if structured justifications are being undertaken, by the common position of seven European nuclear regulators on licensing safety critical software.
There are a number of resources relevant to the use of CAE in the nuclear sector.
The Adelard Safety Case Manual ASCAD was developed with material in nuclear and high hazard industry research projects. A claim-based approach has been developed to understand, assess and justify the safety of I&C systems supported by a strategy triangle of behaviours, vulnerability and standards.
The concept of argument has moved on since the ASCAD manual and the CAEBlocks have been developed. The more recent (2018) approach described within the IAEA Dependability of Software Assessment Guide is based on the descriptions of CAE and CAEBlocks within this site.